Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.005zbMath1236.91026MaRDI QIDQ536081

Drew Fudenberg, Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games; asynchronous monitoring; continuous-time limits; Poisson and diffusion signal processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring, Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals, Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags

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