Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
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Publication:536081
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.005zbMath1236.91026MaRDI QIDQ536081
Drew Fudenberg, Wojciech Olszewski
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.005
repeated games; asynchronous monitoring; continuous-time limits; Poisson and diffusion signal processes
Related Items
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring, Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals, Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
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