Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
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Publication:3989222
DOI10.2307/2938286zbMath0744.90114OpenAlexW2121068993WikidataQ56481620 ScholiaQ56481620MaRDI QIDQ3989222
Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce, Paul R. Milgrom
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938286
Related Items (40)
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? ⋮ Infinitely-repeated games with endogenous discounting ⋮ Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach ⋮ Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships ⋮ Harmful transparency in teams ⋮ The three-legged race: Cooperating to compete ⋮ Information feedback in a dynamic tournament ⋮ Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Uncertainty of time intervals and possibility of collusion in infinitely repeated games ⋮ Strategy-contingent discounting in repeated PD-games ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games ⋮ Self-evident events and the value of linking ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Dynamic price discovery: transparency vs. information design ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals ⋮ A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection ⋮ Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning ⋮ Explicit formulas for repeated games with absorbing states ⋮ Commodity money with frequent search ⋮ Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal ⋮ Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion ⋮ Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact ⋮ Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals ⋮ Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case ⋮ Folk theorem with communication ⋮ Procrastination in teams and contract design ⋮ Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence ⋮ Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment ⋮ INDETERMINACY AND PERIOD LENGTH UNDER BALANCED BUDGET RULES ⋮ Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Efficient dark markets ⋮ A folk theorem for minority games
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