Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2708zbMath1016.91041MaRDI QIDQ5938637

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 5 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2708

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; repeated games; discounting; market structure; prisoner-dilemma; theory of the firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Communication and cooperation in repeated games, Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion, Interacting nonlinear reinforced stochastic processes: Synchronization or non-synchronization, Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information, Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations, Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring, Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy, The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games, Multimarket contact in continuous-time games, Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

Cites Work

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• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion