Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90036-7zbMath0675.90108OpenAlexW2079946160MaRDI QIDQ1122518

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90036-7

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyimperfect monitoringsupergame equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion ⋮ Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview ⋮ On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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