scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673
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Publication:4296856
zbMath0841.90138MaRDI QIDQ4296856
Robert John Aumann, Lloyd S. Shapley
Publication date: 13 July 1994
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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