Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
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Publication:1408709
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00022-8zbMath1056.91007MaRDI QIDQ1408709
Michael Kahneman, Elchanan Ben-Porath
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (12)
The value of recommendations ⋮ Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring ⋮ Community enforcement with observation costs ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Repeated games with voluntary information purchase ⋮ Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters ⋮ Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
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