Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.09.004zbMATH Open1292.91029OpenAlexW2145495738MaRDI QIDQ2439908FDOQ2439908

Scott Duke Kominers, Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11880354

Recommendations

• Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
• Folk theorem with communication
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Stochastic games with information lag

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoringobservation lag

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Repeated Games with Frequent Signals^*
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Folk theorem with communication
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
• Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
• Stochastic games with information lag
• Approachability with delayed information
• Trigger Strategy Equilibriums in Stochastic Differential Games with Information Time Lags: An Analysis of Cooperative Production Strategies

Cited In (7)

• Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals
• Approachability with delayed information
• Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
• Agility in repeated games: an example
• Observation delays in teams and effort cycles
• Asynchronous Schemes for Stochastic and Misspecified Potential Games and Nonconvex Optimization
• Delayed Response in Randomized Play-The-Winner Rule; A Decision Theoretic Outlook

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