Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
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Publication:1939513
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3zbMath1282.91045MaRDI QIDQ1939513
Publication date: 4 March 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1261063683_WP_UNAV_18_09.pdf
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network, Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
Cites Work
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information