Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
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Publication:2373776
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007zbMath1157.91313OpenAlexW3122681218MaRDI QIDQ2373776
Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/04-008.pdf
Related Items (11)
Informational externalities and emergence of consensus ⋮ Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games ⋮ Reputation from nested activities ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ Reputation and impermanent types ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games ⋮ A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning
Cites Work
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- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Who Wants a Good Reputation?
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