Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
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Publication:2373776
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.03.007zbMATH Open1157.91313OpenAlexW3122681218MaRDI QIDQ2373776FDOQ2373776
Authors: Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson 
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/04-008.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Who wants a good reputation?
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
Cited In (12)
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
- Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Reputation effects
- Reputation from nested activities
- A general analysis of sequential social learning
- Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
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