Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
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Publication:2373776
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3256930 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Who wants a good reputation?
Cited in
(12)- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- A general analysis of sequential social learning
- Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
- Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
- Reputation effects
- Reputation from nested activities
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
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