Bounded memory and permanent reputations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.06.006MaRDI QIDQ392656zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Monte

Publication date 15 January 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

learningbounded memoryreputation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• Bounded memory and incomplete information
• Reputation effects
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games

Cites work

• A Theory of Credibility
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Repeated games with one-memory
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and impermanent types
• Reputation in long-run relationships
• Reputation versus social learning
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The absent-minded driver
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(10)

• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems
• Reputation and impermanent types
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory
• Restricted feedback in long term relationships
• Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
• Learning with bounded memory in games
• Order of limits in reputations
• Bounded memory and incomplete information

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