Bounded memory and incomplete information
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Publication:1753297
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.01.004zbMath1390.91045OpenAlexW2790779303MaRDI QIDQ1753297
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.004
Related Items (1)
Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria
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