Repeated games with one-memory

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.003zbMath1154.91334OpenAlexW2099803346MaRDI QIDQ1001829

Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian, Mehmet Barlo

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/803989/1/bo080422.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbounded rationalitymemoryfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (21)

A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games ⋮ Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Selfish optimization and collective learning in populations ⋮ Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Learning with limited memory: Bayesianism vs heuristics ⋮ Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers ⋮ Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring ⋮ Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game ⋮ Variable temptations and black mark reputations ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Community enforcement using modal actions ⋮ Repeated games with one-memory ⋮ ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE* ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria ⋮ Reactive learning strategies for iterated games

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