Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
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Publication:2577441
DOI10.21034/sr.287 10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.001; 10.21034/sr.287zbMath1119.91016MaRDI QIDQ2577441
Harold L. Cole, Narayana R. Kocherlakota
Publication date: 22 December 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.287
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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Cites Work
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
