Restricted feedback in long term relationships
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Publication:665454
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.013zbMath1258.91030OpenAlexW2166973609MaRDI QIDQ665454
Ulrich Doraszelski, Juan F. Escobar
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/133
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