Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1zbMath0606.90019MaRDI QIDQ1085032

Dilip Abreu, Ennio Stacchetti, David G. Pearce

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4632.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

family of static games; optimal symmetric equilibria; reduction of the repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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