Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
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Publication:1839182
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90050-9zbMath0511.90020OpenAlexW2091869658MaRDI QIDQ1839182
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55079
market structure theorydynamical model of industry equilibriumoptimal cartel trigger price strategiesstochastic market demand curve
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