Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games
DOI10.1007/BF00939422zbMath0681.90097MaRDI QIDQ1823883
Boleslaw Tolwinski, Alain B. Haurie
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00939422
dynamic games; fishery management; computation of cooperative equilibria; discounted stochastic sequential games; duopolistic economics; games with unobservable actions
91A12: Cooperative games
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
90C39: Dynamic programming
91B62: Economic growth models
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
90-08: Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming
91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling
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