Equilibria and threats in a fishery management game

DOI10.1002/oca.4660060402zbMath0631.90017MaRDI QIDQ3768650

Raimo P. Hämäläinen, Veijo Kaitala, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Optimal Control Applications and Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.4660060402

zbMATH Keywords

cheating; fish population dynamics; asymptotique open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibria; dynamical bargain solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B62: Economic growth models

92D25: Population dynamics (general)

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

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Cites Work

• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Turnpike Properties for the Optimal Use of a Natural Resource
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