Bargaining on whales: A differential game model with Pareto optimal equilibria
DOI10.1016/0167-6377(84)90064-6zbMath0531.90110OpenAlexW1965551316MaRDI QIDQ788650
Raimo P. Hämäläinen, Veijo Kaitala
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(84)90064-6
optimal controlfishery managementinfinite-horizonenvironmental applicationsKalai-Smorodinsky solutiondynamic bargaining problemopen-loop Nash- equilibriumrenewable resource depletiontwo-country differential game model of whaling
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (7)
Cites Work
- Cooperative equilibria in differential games
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
- A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games
- Optimal control on an infinite time horizon
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Nonzero-sum differential games
- The Bargaining Problem
- On the cheating problem in Stackelberg games†
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Further Aspects of Turnpike Theory in Continuous Time With Applications
- Turnpike Properties for the Optimal Use of a Natural Resource
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