Fish wars with changing area for a fishery

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_28MaRDI QIDQ5198545zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anna N. Rettieva

Publication date 8 August 2011

Published in Advances in Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_28

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5251924 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5064965 (Why is no real title available?)
• A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory

Cited in

(20)

• Equilibria and threats in a fishery management game
• Bioresource management problem with changing area for fishery
• Fighting fish: enumerative properties
• A fair and time-consistent sharing of the joint exploitation payoff of a fishery
• Fish wars with many players
• Cooperative incentive condition in bioresource management problem
• Fish wars: cooperative and non-cooperative approaches
• Fighting fish
• Historical effect in the territoriality of ayu fish
• The effects of different strategic variables in noncooperative fisheries games
• Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery.
• The compleat fish wars: Biological and dynamic interactions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2183046 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1952943 (Why is no real title available?)
• Great fish war with moratorium
• Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem
• The discrete-time bioresource sharing model
• Incentive equilibrium in discrete-time bioresource sharing model
• WHEN TO RATIFY AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT: THE CASE OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES
• Incentive equilibrium in discrete-time bioresource sharing model

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