Sole owner harvesting policies under the threat of entry: A two-stage linear game

DOI10.1016/0095-0696(89)90003-XzbMATH Open0724.90015MaRDI QIDQ2277129FDOQ2277129

Authors: Linda M. Salchenberger 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

renewable resourcenoncooperative differential gameduopoly stageharvesting policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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