The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
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Publication:2460829
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.013zbMath1271.91021OpenAlexW2007071819MaRDI QIDQ2460829
Publication date: 16 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.013
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