The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.12.002zbMath1395.91027OpenAlexW2561983971MaRDI QIDQ516045

Miklós Pintér, Tibor Németh

Publication date: 20 March 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

weak sequential coregeneralized balanced game with universal veto controlnon-transferable utility cooperative gametransferable utility game with uncertaintyuniform \(P\)-balancedness on the coresuniversally balancedness on the cores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Cooperative Games in Stochastic Characteristic Function Form
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• CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

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