The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.12.002MaRDI QIDQ516045zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tibor Németh, Miklós Pintér

Publication date 20 March 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

weak sequential coregeneralized balanced game with universal veto controlnon-transferable utility cooperative gametransferable utility game with uncertaintyuniform \(P\)-balancedness on the coresuniversally balancedness on the cores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games
• CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
• Cooperative Games in Stochastic Characteristic Function Form
• Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
• Transferable utility games with uncertainty

Cited in

(2)

• A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games
• Transferable utility games with uncertainty

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