The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.12.002zbMATH Open1395.91027OpenAlexW2561983971MaRDI QIDQ516045FDOQ516045
Authors: Tibor Németh, Miklós Pintér 
Publication date: 20 March 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.002
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- A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
weak sequential coregeneralized balanced game with universal veto controlnon-transferable utility cooperative gametransferable utility game with uncertaintyuniform \(P\)-balancedness on the coresuniversally balancedness on the cores
Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
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- The Core of an N Person Game
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Credible coalitions and the core
- Transferable utility games with uncertainty
- Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents
- Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- The weak sequential core for two-period economies
- The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
- A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games
- Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Cooperative Games in Stochastic Characteristic Function Form
- Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games
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