Transferable utility games with uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.005zbMath1255.91024OpenAlexW3124858030MaRDI QIDQ643282

Helga Habis, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/636/1/HH_MTDP1120.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyweak sequential coretransferable utility games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites Work

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• Balancedness conditions for exact games
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents
• Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
• The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
• Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
• Cores of convex games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Credible coalitions and the core
• A NOTE ON THE WEAK SEQUENTIAL CORE OF DYNAMIC TU GAMES
• Cooperative Games in Stochastic Characteristic Function Form
• CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

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