Transferable utility games with uncertainty
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Publication:643282
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.005zbMath1255.91024MaRDI QIDQ643282
Helga Habis, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/636/1/HH_MTDP1120.pdf
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