The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces
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Cites work
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions to n-Person Games, II: Two-Stage Solutions
- Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions ton-Person Games. I: The Prior Satisficing Nucleolus
- CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS
- Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1599887 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
- On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs
- Stochastic cooperative games in insurance
- The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs
- The Shapley value for stochastic cooperative game
- Transferable utility games with uncertainty
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