Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions ton-Person Games. I: The Prior Satisficing Nucleolus
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Publication:4124649
DOI10.1137/0131029zbMATH Open0353.90101OpenAlexW1966062834MaRDI QIDQ4124649FDOQ4124649
Authors: A. Charnes, Daniel Granot
Publication date: 1976
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0131029
Cited In (10)
- CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS
- Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
- Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game
- The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces
- Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents
- Reducing the number of linear programs needed for solving the nucleolus problem of \(n\)-person game theory
- Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns
- Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games
- Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
- An approach to solve multi-objective linear production planning games with fuzzy parameters
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