Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions ton-Person Games. I: The Prior Satisficing Nucleolus

DOI10.1137/0131029MaRDI QIDQ4124649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. Charnes, Daniel Granot

Publication date 1976

Published in SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/0131029

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited in

(12)

• Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games
• Reducing the number of linear programs needed for solving the nucleolus problem of n-person game theory
• Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents
• Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
• The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces
• Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
• Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns
• Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game
• An approach to solve multi-objective linear production planning games with fuzzy parameters
• CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS
• Bel coalitional games with application to market games
• Co-investment under revenue uncertainty based on stochastic coalitional game theory

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