Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
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Cites work
- A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Axioms of invariance for TU-games
- Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
- Collusion properties of values
- Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- On weighted Shapley values
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- The proportional solution for rights problems
- Value, consistency, and random coalition formation
Cited in
(23)- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
- The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
- Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism
- Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
- Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
- Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- Axiomatic characterizations of the weighted solidarity values
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Discounted tree solutions
- Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values
- Coalition-weighted Shapley values
- Cooperative games with preferences: application of the weight rule to problems of public space in St. Petersburg
- On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games with transferable utility
- A weighted method for sharing costs in highways
- Axioms of invariance for TU-games
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