A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
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Publication:2341746
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2014.12.019zbMath1311.91013MaRDI QIDQ2341746
Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal
Publication date: 28 April 2015
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2014.12.019
Related Items
Unnamed Item, Characterizations of weighted and equal division values, Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel, Axioms of invariance for TU-games, On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games
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