Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
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Publication:2343804
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.11.003zbMath1310.91022OpenAlexW2161486851MaRDI QIDQ2343804
Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal
Publication date: 6 May 2015
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2013-09.pdf
Related Items (13)
The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ Nullified equal loss property and equal division values ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations ⋮ Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games ⋮ A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
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- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
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