Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2343804
Recommendations
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Axioms of invariance for TU-games
Cites work
- A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- On weighted Shapley values
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(15)- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values
This page was built for publication: Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2343804)
