Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.003zbMath1310.91022MaRDI QIDQ2343804

Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 6 May 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2013-09.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values, A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games, Characterizations of weighted and equal division values, Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games, Nullified equal loss property and equal division values, Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values, The equal collective gains value in cooperative games, Sharing the surplus and proportional values, Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions, Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations, Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games, A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance, Coalitional desirability and the equal division value

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