Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9083-xzbMath1192.91024MaRDI QIDQ1036101

Yukihiko Funaki, René van den Brink

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x

zbMATH Keywords

equal division solution; TU-games; equal surplus sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin, Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value, Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value, On membership and marginal values

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• THE CORE AND CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES: A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS