NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
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Cites work
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
- Collusion properties of values
- Extensions of solution concepts by means of muliplicative \(\epsilon\)-tax games
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Weighted nucleoli
Cited in
(47)- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure
- Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
- Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
- Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
- New axiomatizations of the Owen value
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
- Some game theoretic marketing attribution models
- The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
- Harsanyi support levels solutions
- Fair division in the presence of externalities
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of k-lateral Shapley values
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
- On a class of solidarity values
- An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Value-free reductions
- The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
- Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value
- The airport problem with capacity constraints
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Values with exogenous payments
- Pyramidal values
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7528221 (Why is no real title available?)
- Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
- Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Merge-proofness in minimum cost spanning tree problems
- Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values
- New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value
- Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
- Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
- Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games
- Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value
- Cooperative games with diversity constraints
- Population monotonic path schemes for simple games
- The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
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