NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS

DOI10.1142/S0219198999000220zbMATH Open1045.91502OpenAlexW2149422630WikidataQ59868847 ScholiaQ59868847MaRDI QIDQ4816626FDOQ4816626

Authors: Jean Derks, Hans Haller 

Publication date: 10 September 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000220

Recommendations

• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
• Weighted nucleoli

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Collusion properties of values
• Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Weighted nucleoli
• Extensions of solution concepts by means of muliplicative \(\epsilon\)-tax games

Cited In (43)

• Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
• Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Merge-proofness in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
• Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
• Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
• Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
• Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
• Values with exogenous payments
• Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
• Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values
• Fair division in the presence of externalities
• New axiomatizations of the Owen value
• Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
• A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
• Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
• Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
• New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
• Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
• Population monotonic path schemes for simple games
• Pyramidal values
• Value-free reductions
• Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value
• Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
• Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure
• An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
• Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
• The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure
• Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
• Some game theoretic marketing attribution models
• On a class of solidarity values
• The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
• Harsanyi support levels solutions

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