Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.008zbMath1281.91018OpenAlexW2130443667MaRDI QIDQ2455689

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value equal division solution null player nullifying player equal surplus division solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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