Allocation rules for games with optimistic aspirations
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Publication:457859
DOI10.1155/2013/540487zbMath1305.91026OpenAlexW3123920445WikidataQ58919854 ScholiaQ58919854MaRDI QIDQ457859
Anne van den Nouweland, Luisa Carpente, Balbina V. Casas Méndez, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado
Publication date: 30 September 2014
Published in: Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/540487
Cites Work
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- The truncated core for games with upper bounds
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- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- The optimistic \(TU\) game in minimum cost spanning tree problems
- Values for strategic games in which players cooperate
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