Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

DOI10.1007/s001820400176zbMath1076.91003OpenAlexW3122060815MaRDI QIDQ2572439

Anne van den Nouweland, Luisa Carpente, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, Balbina V. Casas Méndez

Publication date: 9 November 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/107

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitycoalition gamesstrategic gamesvaluematrix gamecolumn dominancerow dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power ⋮ On minimax and Pareto optimal security payoffs in multicriteria games ⋮ Rationalization of detection of the multiple disorders ⋮ Allocation rules for games with optimistic aspirations ⋮ Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory ⋮ The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate ⋮ Characterizations of the value of matrix games ⋮ On the difficulty of extending the coco value to games with more than two players ⋮ Comments on: cooperative games and cost allocation problems ⋮ Cooperation under interval uncertainty ⋮ Coalitional interval games for strategic games in which players cooperate

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