On benefits of cooperation under strategic power
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Publication:2173128
DOI10.1007/S10479-019-03495-6zbMATH Open1437.91029OpenAlexW2996061609MaRDI QIDQ2173128FDOQ2173128
Authors: M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, Ignacio García-Jurado, Ana Meca, Manuel A. Mosquera 
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6
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