Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure
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Publication:6054020
DOI10.1007/s10288-022-00529-xzbMath1527.91010MaRDI QIDQ6054020
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Publication date: 24 October 2023
Published in: 4OR (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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