The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
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Publication:2420827
DOI10.1007/s10957-018-1440-0zbMath1410.91039OpenAlexW2901122627MaRDI QIDQ2420827
Deng-Feng Li, Xun-Feng Hu, Gen-Jiu Xu
Publication date: 7 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1440-0
coalition structureOwen valuetwo-step Shapley valueAumann-Drèze valuetransferable utility cooperative game
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