Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation
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Publication:636016
DOI10.1007/S11750-009-0122-3zbMATH Open1219.91010OpenAlexW2142361842MaRDI QIDQ636016FDOQ636016
Authors: M. Gómez-Rúa, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
Publication date: 25 August 2011
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.567.4681
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Cites Work
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- On weighted Shapley values
- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
- Weighted coalition structure values
- The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
- A value for games with coalition structures
- Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
- Weighted weak semivalues
- Implementation of the levels structure value
Cited In (18)
- The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
- Fuzzy Harsanyi solutions for fuzzy level structure games with multi weight systems
- Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value
- The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
- Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values
- Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited
- A note on the per capita Shapley support levels value
- A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures
- The minimum cost shortest-path tree game
- The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
- Games with nested constraints given by a level structure
- Harsanyi support levels solutions
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