Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation

DOI10.1007/S11750-009-0122-3zbMATH Open1219.91010OpenAlexW2142361842MaRDI QIDQ636016FDOQ636016

Authors: M. Gómez-Rúa, Juan J. Vidal-Puga 

Publication date: 25 August 2011

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.567.4681

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zbMATH Keywords

valuebalanced per capita contributionslevel structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• On weighted Shapley values
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Weighted coalition structure values
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• A value for games with coalition structures
• Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
• Weighted weak semivalues
• Implementation of the levels structure value

Cited In (18)

• The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
• Fuzzy Harsanyi solutions for fuzzy level structure games with multi weight systems
• Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value
• The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
• The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
• Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values
• Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
• The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
• The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited
• A note on the per capita Shapley support levels value
• A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures
• The minimum cost shortest-path tree game
• The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
• Games with nested constraints given by a level structure
• Harsanyi support levels solutions

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