Weighted coalition structure values

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90011-0zbMATH Open0753.90079OpenAlexW2013486699MaRDI QIDQ1198167FDOQ1198167

Richard McLean, Anat Levy

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90011-0

Recommendations

• The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
• The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• Values and coalition configurations
• The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
• On weighted Shapley values

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingaxiomatizationscoalition structurestransferable utility gamesweighted Shapley values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On weighted Shapley values
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games

Cited In (23)

• Coalition structure value considering the outside alignment option of priori coalition
• Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures
• On weighted Kalai--Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
• Coalition-weighted Shapley values
• The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
• The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
• New axiomatizations of the Owen value
• Random order coalition structure values
• The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
• Some open problems in simple games
• On non-transferable utility games with coalition structure
• Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation
• The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
• On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry
• Values and coalition configurations
• A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure
• The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
• Harsanyi support levels solutions

This page was built for publication: Weighted coalition structure values

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1198167)