The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures

DOI10.1007/S11750-011-0191-YzbMATH Open1282.91033OpenAlexW2152669793MaRDI QIDQ384518FDOQ384518

Authors: Yoshio Kamijo 

Publication date: 28 November 2013

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0191-y

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationaxiomatizationcoalition structurecoalition-size weightscollective valuetwo-step Shapley valueweighted Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• On weighted Shapley values
• The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
• A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation
• Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures
• Weighted coalition structure values
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• An implementation of the Owen value.
• Cooperation indices and coalitional value
• A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
• A value for games with coalition structures

Cited In (29)

• Coalition structure value considering the outside alignment option of priori coalition
• A Wide Family of Solutions Based on Marginal Contributions for Situations of Competence—Cooperation with Structure of a Priori Coalition Blocks
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value
• The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
• Weighted coalition structure values
• The in-group egalitarian Owen values
• The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
• Practical application of cooperative solution concepts for distribution problems: an analysis of selected game theoretic solution concepts from an economic point of view
• A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
• Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
• The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
• The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
• The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
• Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
• Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions
• The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
• A consensus value for games with coalition structure
• The extension of combinatorial solutions for cooperative games
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
• Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
• The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
• Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
• A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
• Games with nested constraints given by a level structure

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