A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.007zbMath1400.91023OpenAlexW2612369720MaRDI QIDQ1651266

Dongshuang Hou, Panfei Sun, Hao Sun, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.007

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationShapley valueairport cost pooling gamecollective balanced contributions property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

Cites Work

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