The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited

DOI10.1287/MNSC.28.8.869zbMATH Open0487.90093OpenAlexW2043821802MaRDI QIDQ3948902FDOQ3948902

Authors: Pradeep Dubey 

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.28.8.869

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueairport managementfair cost allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Cited In (19)

• A random arrival rule for airport problems with fuzzy costs
• On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems
• Allocation of portfolio risk and outside options: which is the best coalition structure value to solve the low-risk anomaly?
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Sharing the cost of redundant items
• A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
• On the Shapley value of liability games
• The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach
• Transversality of the Shapley value
• Balancedness of infrastructure cost games.
• An extension of the \(\tau\)-value to games with coalition structures.
• A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
• Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees
• Compromise values in cooperative game theory
• Depreciation games
• Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values

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