Let \((N,c)\) be the airport game of \textit{S. C. Littlechild} and \textit{G. Owen} [Int. J. Game Theory 5, 91--95 (1976; Zbl 0348.90191)]. This paper studies generalized airport games \((N,c,b)\), where the \(b\)-component is interpreted as a maintenance cost, to be appended to the capital cost of the \(c\)-component. The main results are as follows: Every generalized airport game is balanced, and thus has a non-empty core. The nucleolus is in the core. Finally, a algorithm for computing the nucleolus is presented. This algorithm itself extends that for the airport game.
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- Common Costs, Fixed Charges, Clubs and Games
- Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems
- How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226097 (Why is no real title available?)
- The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
- Horizontal cooperation in a multimodal public transport system: the profit allocation problem
- Some new results on generalized additive games
- On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems
- A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
- How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
- A polynomial expression for the Owen value in the maintenance cost game
- An overview on game theory applications to engineering
- Cost allocation in asymmetric trees
- Airport games: the core and its center
- Cost allocation in common facilities sharing
- A note on the computation of the SHAPLEY value for von Neumann-Morgenstern market games
- Cooperative games and cost allocation problems
This page was built for publication: Balancedness of infrastructure cost games.
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5953348)
