Balancedness of infrastructure cost games.
DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00073-XzbMATH Open1050.91020OpenAlexW2009063410MaRDI QIDQ5953348FDOQ5953348
Authors: Henk Norde, Vito Fragnelli, Ignacio García-Jurado, Fioravante Patrone, Stef Tijs 
Publication date: 5 August 2002
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(01)00073-x
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
- How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems
- The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
- Common Costs, Fixed Charges, Clubs and Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (12)
- On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems
- Horizontal cooperation in a multimodal public transport system: the profit allocation problem
- Cost allocation in common facilities sharing
- Some new results on generalized additive games
- Cost allocation in asymmetric trees
- An overview on game theory applications to engineering
- A polynomial expression for the Owen value in the maintenance cost game
- A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
- How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
- Cooperative games and cost allocation problems
- Airport games: the core and its center
- A note on the computation of the SHAPLEY value for von Neumann-Morgenstern market games
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