On the Shapley value of liability games

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2021.10.012MaRDI QIDQ2670595zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Péter Csóka, Ferenc Illés, Tamás Solymosi

Publication date 11 March 2022

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

constant-sum gamegame theoryinsolvencyliability gameShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(9)

• Liability games
• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
• Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
• Optimization methods and algorithms
• Schedule situations and their cooperative game theoretic representations
• Game of banks -- biform game theoretical framework for ATM network cost sharing
• The concede-and-divide rule for liability problems
• The many Shapley values for explainable artificial intelligence: a sensitivity analysis perspective

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