How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.02.003zbMATH Open1280.91133OpenAlexW3125623154MaRDI QIDQ2637409FDOQ2637409
Authors: Pierre Dehez, Samuel Ferey 
Publication date: 11 February 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2012_23web.pdf
Recommendations
coreShapley valuecausationtransferable utility gametort lawacceptable judgmentsdivision of joint liabilitymisconductpotential damage
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of statistical and quantum mechanics to economics (econophysics) (91B80)
Cites Work
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Cited In (17)
- Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law’s Umbrella
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
- On the Shapley value of liability games
- Sharing a collective probability of success
- The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Liability situations with successive tortfeasors
- Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
- Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
- On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
- Optimal Compensation for Data-Sharing in Registration Processes
- Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations
- Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
- Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
- Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning
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