How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2637409zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Dehez, Samuel Ferey

Publication date 11 February 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2012_23web.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreShapley valuecausationtransferable utility gametort lawacceptable judgmentsdivision of joint liabilitymisconductpotential damage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of statistical and quantum mechanics to economics (econophysics) (91B80)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
• Cores of convex games
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On weighted Shapley values
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• Sharing a river.
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Weighted values and the core

Cited in

(17)

• Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law’s Umbrella
• Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• On the Shapley value of liability games
• Sharing a collective probability of success
• The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5685000 (Why is no real title available?)
• Liability situations with successive tortfeasors
• Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
• Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
• Optimal Compensation for Data-Sharing in Registration Processes
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations
• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
• Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

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