How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2637409zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Dehez, Samuel Ferey

Publication date 11 February 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2012_23web.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

acceptable judgmentscausationcoredivision of joint liabilitymisconductpotential damageShapley valuetort lawtransferable utility game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of statistical and quantum mechanics to economics (econophysics) (91B80)

Recommendations

• Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
• On the Shapley value of liability games
• SHARE OPPORTUNITY SETS AND COOPERATIVE GAMES
• Fair sharing in cooperative games
• The joint belief function and Shapley value for the joint cooperative game

Cites work

• A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Cores of convex games
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4162686 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On weighted Shapley values
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• Sharing a river.
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Weighted values and the core

Cited in

(27)

• Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
• Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations
• Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning
• On the Shapley value of liability games
• Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Optimal Compensation for Data-Sharing in Registration Processes
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
• Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law’s Umbrella
• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5685000 (Why is no real title available?)
• Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
• Sharing a collective probability of success
• The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
• Liability situations with successive tortfeasors
• The conceivable scope of negligence rules for internalizing multidirectional externalities
• Fair allocation in hierarchies: a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism
• Sharing the losses of a hierarchical venture
• The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations
• New axiomatizations of the priority value for cooperative games with priority structure
• Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding
• Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
• The expected Shapley value on a class of probabilistic TU games
• Axiomatic analysis of depreciation problems
• New values for cooperative games: two approaches from the filtration theory

This page was built for publication: How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2637409)