Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2020.04.011MaRDI QIDQ2183226zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Béal, Florian Navarro

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2020-01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

solidarity valueequal division value(weighted-) Shapley valueequal playersequal treatment of necessary playersnecessary players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX) Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Recommendations

• Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
• Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
• Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
• Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
• Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Marginality and Myerson values
• Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• On weighted Shapley values
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values
• Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
• The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
• The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
• The within groups and the between groups Myerson values
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games

Cited in

(4)

• Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
• Egalitarian allocation and players of certain type
• The Misnamings of Playfair’s Axiom
• Necessary players and values

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