``Procedural values for cooperative games
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Publication:1939522
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0361-7zbMath1282.91035MaRDI QIDQ1939522
Publication date: 4 March 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0361-7
efficiency; cooperative game; procedure; value; weak monotonicity; coalitional monotonicity; extended procedure
91A12: Cooperative games
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