``Procedural values for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0361-7zbMath1282.91035OpenAlexW2111221468MaRDI QIDQ1939522

Marcin Malawski

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0361-7

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycooperative gameprocedurevalueweak monotonicitycoalitional monotonicityextended procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (30)

Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property ⋮ Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games ⋮ Evolutionary coalitional games ⋮ Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value ⋮ On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values ⋮ Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value ⋮ Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value ⋮ Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values ⋮ A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ Information, egalitarianism and the value ⋮ Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization ⋮ The family of ideal values for cooperative games ⋮ Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river ⋮ Pyramidal values ⋮ Recursive and bargaining values ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values ⋮ A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data ⋮ Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values ⋮ Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value ⋮ Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value ⋮ The Efficient, Symmetric and Linear Values for Cooperative Games and Their Characterizations ⋮ A matching value for cooperative games ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On weighted Shapley values
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
• The selectope for cooperative games
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• On convex combinations of two values

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