Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.008zbMATH Open1394.91025OpenAlexW2512181165MaRDI QIDQ324152FDOQ324152

C. Miamo Wendji, C. Chameni Nembua

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.008

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesdesirability relationlinear valuesLorenz dominancePigou-Dalton transfersweakly linear games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
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• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
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• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
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• Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
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• On convex combinations of two values
• Taking empirical studies seriously: The principle of concentration and the measurement of welfare and inequality

Cited In (3)

• The fairness of solidarity bills under the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik
• Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
• A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data

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