Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.008MaRDI QIDQ324152zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors C. Chameni Nembua, C. Miamo Wendji

Publication date 10 October 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesdesirability relationlinear valuesLorenz dominancePigou-Dalton transfersweakly linear games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1031402 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910816 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A class of simple games
• A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
• Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
• Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• On convex combinations of two values
• On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
• On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• Taking empirical studies seriously: The principle of concentration and the measurement of welfare and inequality
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• The decomposition of inequality reconsidered: weakly decomposable measures
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games

Cited in

(4)

• Atkinson-Shapley rules for TU-games: on the trade-off between efficiency and inequality
• The fairness of solidarity bills under the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik
• Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
• A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data

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