scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910816

MaRDI QIDQ4885986zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg

Publication date 3 September 1996

zbMATH Keywords

Lorenz dominationmajority rulesShapley valuesymmetric simple gametax payersvoting by accountvoting by count

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(12)

• Complete simple games
• Cooperative games with hedonic coalitions
• A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
• A power analysis of linear games with consensus
• Simple games and magic squares
• Egalitarian property for power indices
• Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
• Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
• On -roughly weighted games
• Power analysis of voting by count and account
• A decisiveness index for simple games
• A minimum dimensional class of simple games

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