scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910816

zbMATH Open0856.90029MaRDI QIDQ4885986FDOQ4885986

Authors: Bezalel Peleg 

Publication date: 3 September 1996

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueLorenz dominationmajority rulessymmetric simple gametax payersvoting by accountvoting by count

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (12)

• Power analysis of voting by count and account
• Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
• A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
• Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
• A decisiveness index for simple games
• Egalitarian property for power indices
• Complete simple games
• A power analysis of linear games with consensus
• A minimum dimensional class of simple games
• On \(\alpha\)-roughly weighted games
• Cooperative games with hedonic coalitions
• Simple games and magic squares

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