Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
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The paper provides a self-contained axiomatization of linear inequality measure for coalitional games. We prove that any complete, transitive continuous and anonymous preference relation on the set of finite coalitional games which satisfies some independence properties can be represented as a generalized Gini function of the Shapley value. Also, we generalize the foregoing result to the spaces pNA(\(\mu\)) of non-atomic games.
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Cites work
- A controversial proposal concerning inequality measurement
- An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility
- Generalized Gini inequality indices
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- Measure-Based Values of Market Games
- Measure-Based Values of Nonatomic Games
- Measurement of inequality: An attempt at unification and generalization
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- Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
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Cited in
(9)- Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation
- Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games
- A graph-based approach to inequality assessment
- A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data
- Decompositions of inequality measures from the perspective of the Shapley-Owen value
- Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
- Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions
- Correlation and inequality in weighted majority voting games
- A general model for multi-parameter weighted voting games
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